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I. Introduction 
This essay addresses the question whether groups of individual humans – for instance, 
courts, corporations, or labor unions – have mental states of their own, over and above 
those of their members. My methodological orientation is naturalistic, and thus I treat the 
matter as a question in philosophy of science, primarily in the philosophy of cognitive 
science.1 Accordingly, I focus on such questions as “In virtue of what is a state or process 
cognitive?” and “What kind of evidence would support the claim that groups have 
cognitive states or engage in cognitive processing?” With regard to the latter question, I 
take particular interest in cases in which group processing differs significantly from 
processing in individual humans, asking what sameness of kind amounts to – or, rather, 
                                                      
 This paper descends from the previously circulated manuscript “Individuals as Group Minds, Group 
Minds as Individuals.” Significant portions of this material were presented at Macquarie U., U. of 
Auckland, U. of Edinburgh, Ruhr U. Bochum, Collective Intentionality IX at Indiana U., Trends in 
Interdisciplinary Sciences III, Johns Hopkins U., and Humboldt U., and to New York U.’s Philosophy of 
Mind Discussion Group. Many thanks to numerous audience members and group participants for their 
helpful feedback. Special thanks in this regard to Georg Theiner. 
1 A large literature on group minds has been driven primarily by reflections on ordinary ways of ascribing 
mental states. For example, in describing her methodological assumptions, Margaret Gilbert says, “Suffice 
it to say that my own tendency is to go with everyday discourse, as I understand it. If such-and-such a 
phenomenon is referred to, seriously and literally, as belief, it is hard to argue that it is not, after all, belief 
as this is ordinarily understood” (2003, 103). I set this literature aside. I would like to know whether groups 
really are in cognitive states of their own, and to my mind, that requires making our best sense of scientific 
work on cognition, largely disregarding what the folk tend to think about matters mental and cognitive 
(acknowledging, however, that folk patterns of usage may, in the end, help to determine, not so much 
where nature’s joints lie, but how to label the categories thereby carved out – see Stich 1996, chpt. 1). For 
similar reasons, I set aside empirical investigations of folk tendencies to ascribe psychological states to 
groups (Knobe and Prinz 2008, Sytsma and Machery 2009, 2010, Arico 2010, Huebner et al. 2010).  
 Note, too, that a complete naturalistic picture must take into account results from the social 
sciences, for the question at hand resolves into two main components: “What is cognition?” and “Do extant 
groups have cognitive states or engage in cognitive processing?” I here focus on the first component 
question, and thus my emphasis on philosophy of cognitive science rather than on philosophy of social 
science. 
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what sort of evidence would support the claim to sameness of kind – across such 
differences. 
 Certain trends in the cognitive and social sciences frame the discussion. Over the 
past three decades or so, it has become increasingly clear that distributed collections of 
processes produce a substantial portion of intelligent human behavior (Dennett 1991, 
Brooks 1999, Gendler 2008, Evans and Frankish 2009, Clark 1997). During roughly the 
same period, an increasing number of researchers working in the cognitive and social 
sciences, as well as in empirically oriented philosophy of mind, have argued that some 
extant groups of individual humans have mental or cognitive states of their own (Huebner 
2013, Hutchins 1995, Goldstone and Gureckis 2009, Goldstone and Theiner 2017, 
Theiner and O’Connor 2010, Barnier et al. 2008, List and Pettit 2011, Schwitzgebel 
2015). This appears to be no coincidence; recognition of the decentralized nature of 
human cognitive processing lends an increased air of plausibility to the thought that such 
distributed entities as courts, corporations, and citizenries might be in genuine cognitive 
states. In fact, some authors discuss the two questions explicitly in tandem (Hutchins 
1995, Wilson 2004, Tollefsen 2006, Theiner, Allen, and Goldstone 2010). 
 The question naturally arises, then, whether these two lines of research – on 
distributed cognition in individual humans, on the one hand, and on group processes, on 
the other – investigate the same natural kinds, states, properties, or processes,2 for 
example, belief, memory, and cognition. If groups do appear to have memories of their 
own, are those states of the same natural kind as the individual human states that we refer 
to as ‘memories’? What does it amount to for there to be both an overarching kind 
                                                      
2 For present purposes, I use these terms interchangeably, all providing a way of referring to joints in nature 
that the sciences attempt to identify. 
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memory as well as particular species of it? If there is group-level cognition, is it the same 
kind of cognition as individual humans engage in? And what, one might wonder, would it 
amount to for there to be different species of the genus cognition? How deep do 
sameness-of-kind relations run across the individual and group cases, and how should 
one should go about trying to determine how deep they run? 
 Here, in preview, is what follows. In Section II, I consider two arguments for 
realism about group states. I find both lines of reasoning inconclusive, largely because 
they proceed absent an account of sameness of natural kind and thus leave the central 
question unanswered. In Section III, I articulate a theory of the sort of evidence that could 
support claims to the sameness (or difference) of natural kinds (including, most 
importantly, thin, generic, or superordinate kinds) across cases. Elsewhere I’ve called this 
the ‘tweak-and-extend’ account (Rupert 2013). In order to apply the tweak-and-extend 
test, one must have in hand models of the data that are meant to be explained by the 
hypothesized instances of the kind in question. Therefore, in Section IV, I present what I 
take to be the best going model of the generic kind cognition, at least as it appears in the 
human case. If this view of cognition is correct, it removes a potential barrier to genuine 
group-level cognition; for, the view allows an individual with cognitive states to be 
decentralized. Section V pursues this thought, drawing on the material presented in 
Sections III and IV to develop a more definite version of the proposal that groups have 
cognitive states that are of a different kind of cognition from individual human cognition. 
Section VI canvasses objections and ultimately sounds a pessimistic note.  
II. Realism, Reduction, and Functional Similarity 
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A view is realist with regard to group cognition if and only if, according to that view, (a) 
in a significant number of cases, an actual groups of humans, as a single entity, has 
cognitive states of its own and (b) such states are of the same relevant kind, qua cognitive 
states, as the states of individual humans. The kind of realism I have in mind does not rest 
on equivocation, metaphor, as-if attribution, or the deployment of homographs or “merely 
nominal” kind terms. The radical cachet of the view stems from its bold realism about 
many actual groups: when the sentence “England believes that withdrawing from the 
European Union is in its best interest” is truly asserted, that sentence is made true by the 
state of a single entity, according to the realist, viz. the United Kingdom’s having a single 
belief of same natural kind as beliefs held by individual humans (whether for or against 
Brexit, or concerning any other matter). 
 In the present section, I consider two arguments for realism. The first has the 
flavor of an anti-reductionist argument (though see section VI for reservations about this 
characterization of it). The second focuses on the similarity of cognitive processing in 
groups to cognitive processing in the individual human. Neither argument clearly carries 
the day, or so I contend. Discussion of the arguments’ weaknesses throws into strong 
relief the adjudicative potential of an account of the relation being-of-the-same-natural-
kind-as. 
 
1. Argument from naturalistic principles of ontological commitment 
The first argument appears in a recent paper by Christian List (2018), which focuses 
primarily on the possibility of group phenomenal consciousness, a topic I here set aside. 
As a way to frame the discussion, List summarizes what he takes to be the strongest, 
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extant argument for realism about group cognition,3 an argument that he has helped to 
develop in a series of prior publications, perhaps most notably in a book co-authored with 
Philip Pettit (List and Pettit 2011): 
Premise 1: Our best social-scientific theories of certain social 
phenomena—for instance, our best theories of the behaviour of firms in 
the market place—attribute belief-desire agency of the functionalist kind 
to (some of) the collectives involved, often by representing them as agents 
in the decision- and game-theoretic sense. 
 
Intermediate conclusion: According to a naturalistic definition of 
ontological commitment, those theories are then ontologically committed 
to group agents. 
 
Premise 2: We should, at least defeasibly, take the ontological 
commitments of our best scientific theories in any given domain at face 
value. 
 
Conclusion: We should, at least defeasibly, take our best social-scientific 
theories’ commitment to group agents at face value. (List 2018, 298) 
 
And, to be clear, taking these commitments at face value commits one, at least 
provisionally, to the existence of genuine group agents with their own beliefs and desires 
(or judgements and preferences, as it is often put in List and Pettit [2011]).4 
                                                      
3 List is a realist about group cognition, though not about group phenomenal consciousness. 
4 This represents only one of the two realist arguments developed by List and Pettit – their argument from 
positive social science (2011, 10ff.). List and Pettit also build a normative case for realism, which rests on 
such intuitions as that every good or bad action requires the apportioning of an appropriately corresponding 
amount of praise or blame; as List and Pettit see things, in some cases, the blame or praise properly 
distributed among individual members of a group does not sum to a sufficient amount given the nature of 
the act in question, and thus a group agent exists as something to be held responsible and given the 
remainder of the praise or blame (2011, 166). Such normative intuitions seem clearly out of place in the 
present context, the theme of which is, roughly, “what cognitive science tells us about realism,” for such 
intuitions have no probative force in cognitive science; rather, they exist only as phenomena, that is, as data 
the production of which is to be modelled using standard cognitive scientific tools; and there is no reason to 
think cognitive science’s best models of the production of such intuitions will include normative facts (in 
the philosopher’s sense) as elements. 
 One might wonder, however, whether normativity plays a more direct role in cognitive science, by 
being presupposed, for instance, by Bayesian-based research programs (see, e.g., Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, 
Perfors, and Tenenbaum 2010). Such research seems driven by claims about how problems ought to be 
solved, viz. in a Bayes-optimal fashion. Note, however, that, in this research program, normativity does not 
play a role analogous to the role it plays in List and Pettit’s reasoning. On List and Pettit’s view, intuitions 
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 Given List’s reference to social-scientific theories and his appeal to a naturalistic 
principle of ontological commitment, the reader can safely assume that he has in mind 
natural, or scientifically respectable, kinds. If Premise 1 is true and the successes at issue 
are genuine, then the kinds in question are, in fact, scientifically respectable. (In some 
cases, our best models are not terribly successful; but in the present context, charity 
demands that we understand something’s being the best theory as entailing that it is at 
least moderately successful – successful enough to warrant ontological commitment.) 
 Of central concern in the present context is the question whether beliefs and 
desires as characterized by the social-scientific theories in question are of the same 
scientifically respectable state-types as the state-types that humans are typically in when 
they have what are commonly called ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’. It is hardly guaranteed that 
all applications of ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ refer to the same natural kind, any more than all 
                                                      
or judgments about normative matters – how much holding of responsibility is required relative to a given 
action – play the role of fixed premises. But, in cognitive science, Bayesian thinking plays a much more 
pragmatic role, providing inspiration for the development of models that are then evaluated by independent 
standards. Bayesian cognitive modelers attempt to match human performance by guiding the search for 
mechanisms that perform Bayesian inference “in a variety of implicit and approximate ways” (Griffiths et 
al. 2010, 362). More generally speaking, Griffiths et al. hope for a “synthesis with more bottom-up, 
mechanistically constrained approaches to modeling the mind” (ibid., 362). On this view, “Probabilistic 
models are a tool for exploring different sets of assumptions about representations and inductive biases, 
making it possible for data to lead us to an account of human cognition” (ibid., 363). Bayesian principles do 
not represent a priori or commonsense truths about human cognition, truths that constrain the selection of 
models in cognitive science (leading cognitive scientists to reject otherwise superior models of the data 
because they do not portray human cognition as optimally Bayesian). Rather, the use of Bayesian principles 
helps researchers to formulate possible models of the human cognitive process and understand why a 
process, so modeled, might be useful to the organism, even if actual human cognition is not Bayesian. For 
Griffiths et al., the Bayesian top-down approach is an empirical bet about methodology. They offer 
empirical arguments for their approach, for example, that Bayesian cognitive modeling is more likely to 
explore the space of possibilities effectively, and less likely to get bogged down in dead-ends, than is a 
mechanisms-first approach (ibid., 358). Implicit in this style of argument is a commitment to contingency: 
if the competing, mechanisms-first approach produces models that account well for human behavior, while 
the top-down Bayesian approach flounders, Griffiths et al. will have lost their empirical bet and will 
abandon the Bayesian program. The attitude Griffiths et al. take toward the normativity presupposed by 
Bayesian modeling, treating it as a kind of tool that might be fruitful in the context of discovery or as a way 
of seeing the advantages of certain problem-solving strategies, seems well advised and to apply equally to 
the general question of how much normativity is presupposed by cognitive-scientific methodology. Thanks 
to Antonia Peacocke, David Chalmers, and Steven Gross for pressing me on normativity-related issues. 
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applications of ‘jade’ do (Putnam 1975). Consider that typical groups and typical 
individual humans differ enormously in ways that are, at least prima facie, 
psychologically relevant. Take, for example, matters to do with domestic life and 
interpersonal interaction. Groups do not post dating profiles on Web sites and make 
arrangements to join each other for coffee or drinks. Groups do not put their offspring 
down for naps, making sure first to change their baby-groups’ diapers. Individual humans 
have characteristic developmental patterns and experiences that groups do not have, for 
example, the experience of learning a song about their first-language’s alphabet or of 
coming to understand aspects of group dynamics by participating in organized sporting 
activities. And so on, throughout a wide range of humans’ everyday affairs. It would be 
no surprise, then, to discover that the cognitive states operative in the production of a 
distinctively human life were of a different kind from the group-level states that produce, 
for example, court decisions, even if the latter states are sometimes called ‘beliefs’ and 
‘desires’ and even if they play an important causal-explanatory role in the social sciences, 
and thus are not at all uninteresting.5 
 How shall the issue be decided? A convincing account of sameness and difference 
of natural kinds – or of what sort of evidence we might have for sameness or difference 
of two members of a natural kind – would provide one promising path forward. This is 
the subject of Section III, below.  
                                                      
5 The point here is that group states might be of enormous scientific and philosophical interest even if 
groups have no cognitive or psychological states – or, to be more cautious, have no states of the same 
natural kind as the human states picked out when we use cognitive, psychological, or mentalistic terms. I 
include this qualification because my immediate concern is not to identify real cognitive, mental, or 
psychological states, where being the genuine article is thought to carry some sort of privilege or normative 
status, only in the realist’s claim that the states of interest are of the same kind across the human and group 
cases. 
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 To be fair, though, List might take the question about sameness of kind to have 
been answered. After all, List and Pettit go to some lengths to state and explain their 
account of what it is to be an agent: an entity is an agent if and only if it has 
representational states, motivational states, and the ability to combine these in appropriate 
ways to act on its environment (List and Pettit 2011, 20). This says, essentially, that 
something is an agent if and only if it has a belief-desire psychology, behaving in ways 
that obey, and can be predicted and explained by, applications of the practical syllogism. 
 This, however, is too schematic to be satisfying. It trades on the reader’s 
familiarity with folk psychology, that is, with everyday explanatory practices of value in 
our interaction with conspecifics; but it does not address the difficult questions about 
genuine sameness of natural kind. In particular, it does not establish that (a) folk 
psychological kinds are natural kinds (that is, whether representational and motivational 
states, as they’re conceived of by the folk, appear in any scientific theories successful 
enough to warrant ontological commitment)6 or (b) that the states adverted to in List’s 
Premise 1 are of the same kind as whatever sort of folk states are vindicated by cognitive 
science (or are of the same kind as whatever states cognitive science puts in place of folk 
psychological state-types). Cognitive science has produced accounts of motivational and 
representational states, but typically these characterize states, processes, and mechanisms 
not likely to appear in extant groups, and thus the success of such accounts hardly shows 
that the thin property being a motivational state plays a robust causal-explanatory role. 
                                                      
6 I duly acknowledge (while also remaining skeptical about) Fodor’s reasons for thinking that 
computational psychology vindicates an ontologically robust version of folk psychological theorizing 
(Fodor 1987, ch. 1; cf. Churchland 1981). 
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 Let me come at this concern from a somewhat different angle. List and Pettit set 
their discussion of state-types in a theoretical context, a context indicated by List’s 
Premise 1. They are functionalists about mental states (Putnam 1967, Lewis 1980, 
Shoemaker 1981). List and Pettit cannot be faulted for this; the functionalist approach to 
mental state-types holds the position of front-runner in philosophy of mind. But, this 
functionalist perspective also provides a perspicuous framework within which to pinpoint 
the lacuna in List’s argument.  
 On the functionalist view, to be in a given type of mental state is to be in a state 
that plays a distinct causal-functional role in the subject’s overall economy of states that 
mediate between input and output. To be in the sort of state-type that a human is in is to 
be in a state that holds the same place as the one held by the corresponding human state 
in a massively internally interconnected construct, involving hope, perception, fear, 
memory, dreaming, inference, etc. (or their cognitive-scientific descendants). How much 
detail should be built into this network is a matter of controversy (Block 1978), but this 
much is clear: List must identify a functionalist conception of belief and desire 
sufficiently fine-grained that the states in question play a significant causal-explanatory 
role (or appear as non-extraneous elements in our best, reasonably successful models of 
human behavior), but not so fine-grained that they clearly are not possessed by the typical 
groups of interest.7 
 Assume reasonably enough that the Ramsey sentence (Lewis 1970) of human 
psychology, as delivered by cognitive science (not folk psychology), contains at least a 
modest amount of detail. What, then, is the relation between it and social-scientific 
                                                      
7 This line of argument parallels the dilemma presented in Rupert (2004, sections V–VIII) in the context of 
the debate about individual-level extended mind and cognition (Clark and Chalmers 1998). 
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models? It is highly doubtful that Ramsified social-scientific theory as a whole – a theory 
of political organizations or a theory of judicial organizations – has anything like the 
same structure of the Ramsey sentence of human psychology. In which case, given the 
holistic nature of functionalist state-individuation, humans and the groups in question 
share none of the relevant states. At the very least, we should demand a positive account 
of sameness of natural kind – beyond the bare comparison of our explanation of group 
behavior to folk-psychological belief-desire explanation – to support the realist’s claim 
that the natural kinds in question are the same.8 
 What tends to obscure the problem at issue is the fragmentary nature of many 
influential models in the social sciences of interest to List, including typical game-
theoretic or decision-theoretic explanatory structures, for example, those discussed in 
connection with the Prisoner’s Dilemma (List and Pettit 2011, 107–108) or the 
mechanism for maintaining overall consistency in group-level decisions when 
confronting the Discursive Dilemma (ibid., 45–46). Of course, many explanatory 
structures deployed in cognitive modeling are also mere fragments of psychological 
theory, but the holy grail of cognitive science is the construction of an architecture (e.g., 
SOAR, LEABRA, ACT-R, or GPS), within the context of which the various fragments 
will cohere as part of a single (ideally autonomous) agent – in which the language parser 
is functionally interwoven with the face-recognition mechanisms, and so on. Consider the 
claim that a corporation can act rationally in the market place, a claim that rests on a 
                                                      
8 The device of Ramsification provides a formal tool for schematizing psychological theory. A Ramsey 
sentence does so by amalgamating or stitching together many successful fragmentary models (that is, 
models of specific data sets or models of families of related data sets). Overarching state-types – such as 
belief – might be made explicit in the relevant models and thus in the Ramsey sentence built from them; or 
such types may be only implicitly defined, say, by common structural patterns detectable in various parts of 
the Ramsey sentence at issue. In either case, the question remains open whether the types, so defined, are 
shared by groups and individual humans. 
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certain conception of what’s optimized by the corporation’s input-output function. Taken 
out of the context of the Ramsification of human psychology as a whole, this might seem 
to reflect the operation of the same kind of states as are at work when an individual 
human optimizes his performance with regard to, say, household finances. But, when set 
within the context of the Ramsification of individual psychology as a whole and the 
Ramsification of the theory of corporate structure as a whole, there would seem to be no 
merit to the claim of sameness of kind, given that the overlap between structures is likely 
to be very small and fragmentary. The particular group-level explanation in question 
relies on a collection of interacting states the behavior of which might match a small 
collection of states in the Ramsification of human psychology, and even then, only within 
a highly limited range. The matching of a small fragment across a highly limited range of 
cases is hardly grounds for asserting sameness of natural kind – at least not if one 
assumes, as List does, a functionalist conception of mental states. Anyone attempting to 
evaluate List’s argument should want, at the very least, a more explicit account of the 
kind of evidence that would support his claim to sameness of natural kind across 
individuals and groups (that is, of the kind of evidence that would support the claim that 
the various uses of ‘belief’, etc. in question refer to the same natural kind across the cases 
of humans and groups) and an application of that standard to the matters at hand.9 
                                                      
9 List and Pettit do not focus exclusively on agents’ individual states, such as beliefs and desires. They 
frequently emphasize properties of the agent’s psychology as a whole, such as consistency and coherence 
over time. They argue that in order to construct group-level institutions that serve our needs, we must 
carefully structure these institutions – by codifying the use of certain methods of aggregating individual 
humans’ judgements and preferences – in ways that endow groups with such properties as consistency, 
coherence, and completeness (where to be complete is to be such that, for any of the relevant propositions, 
the group either endorses it or endorses its negation; List and Pettit 2011, 53), the idea partly being that 
such properties must hold of groups in order that belief-desire psychology be fruitfully applied to them. 
 List and Pettit do little, however, to support the claim that the properties in question in fact hold of 
individual humans. They appeal to intuitive conceptions of the role such properties play in human 
psychology and on claims about how we would like our institutions to function, without making a case that 
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2. Similarity-based arguments  
Many authors have argued for realism by drawing direct comparisons to the case of 
individual humans. It is claimed that group-level processing involves the complex 
computational transformation of representations (Hutchins 1995), as is widely thought to 
be the basis of human cognition, or it comprises the operation of algorithms or 
mechanisms – such as lateral inhibition (Goldstone and Theiner 2017) – that play a 
significant role in models of human processing. It has seemed to many to follow from 
such similarities that groups have the same kinds of cognitive or mental states as humans 
(Huebner 2008, 109, 2013; Rovane 2014, 1663; Tollefsen 2006, 144; Theiner and 
O’Connor 2010, 89; Theiner et al. 2010, 382–383). 
 Such arguments would seem most convincing when they appeal to fine-grained 
similarities across humans and groups, similarities in the sorts of properties and processes 
of interest in the scientific study of human cognition. If we can identify similarities with 
respect to the very processes, structures, and kinds that do causal-explanatory work in the 
cognitive-scientific modeling of data involving intelligent human performance, we can be 
confident that we have found shared natural kinds of the relevant sort. 
 This, however, is a tall order, unlikely to be filled. As an illustration, consider the 
influential proposal that the architecture of the human mind contains specialized modules. 
On Fodor’s view (1983), the human architecture consists of (at least) (a) peripheral 
transducers, (b) domain-specific modules (e.g., sensory systems), (c) a central-processing 
                                                      
the global properties we might thereby create in groups are of the same natural kind as global properties of 
individual human cognitive systems. Although some vague conception of rationality is likely to apply to 
humans and to certain groups, the questions remain open just how thin the shared kind in question is and 
whether a kind that thin does any causal-explanatory work. 
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unit that reasons holistically, and (d) output systems. This is a schematic start. But, of 
course, cognitive scientists spend most of their time filling in details of such architectural 
schemata. For example, with regard to output systems, it has been claimed the human 
motor system includes emulator circuits; part of such a circuit receives a copy of an 
outgoing motor command (a so-called efferent copy) and runs a very fast simulation that 
can, for instance, predict whether the appendage being moved will land where it was 
meant to land, all in time for a compensatory motor command to be sent, if the appendage 
does not appear to be on its proper path (Grush 1997). With regard to the fleshing out of 
the details of human cognitive processing, that is the tip of the iceberg. As such detail 
mounts, the idea that group processing might have the same structure as human 
processing – at the same level of grain typically of interest to cognitive scientists – seems 
incredible. Detailed profiles of human cognitive functioning fill millions of pages, tome 
after tome, journal article after journal article, cataloguing the often-quirky, highly 
specific workings of, for example, human memory and human vision. If one focuses on 
the sorts of states, processes, and causal profiles of interest to working cognitive 
scientists, similarity reasoning appears to be a dead end. 
 At the same time, as such details pile up, one begins to chafe at the chauvinism of 
it all; perhaps the human architecture – with all of its quirky, kludgy forms of processing 
– suffices for cognition. But, is it necessary? Must a group really work in just that way in 
order to cognize? Why not say, instead, that some groups cognize, but that it is a different 
species of cognition from human cognition?10 To make such a case convincing, however, 
                                                      
10 In this respect, the present discussion dovetails a long-running debate about functionalism and 
chauvinism at the individual level (Block 1978). On the role this issue has played in debates about 
distributed cognition and the extended mind, see Rupert (2004, 2013), Clark (2008), Sprevak (2009), and 
Wheeler (2011). 
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requires an account of when two kinds are species of the same overarching, generic kind, 
cognition. 
III. The Tweak-and-Extend Account of Shared Kind-hood 
What, then, distinguishes a generic but still natural kind from a merely nominal kind? 
Minimally, various species of a generic natural kind bear a family resemblance to each 
other (Wheeler 2011), but not just any family resemblance will suffice; there must, I 
contend, be a causal-explanatory unity to various instances of a kind. Claims to sameness 
of kind are most convincingly legitimated by a certain pattern in models of the 
phenomena of interest: our best models of the way in which various species produce 
instances of the relevant explananda must have significantly overlapping elements and 
relations among those elements. This would seem to be the order of the day in most 
sciences; an initial (typically simple) model of some paradigmatic phenomenon succeeds 
(well enough), and then related phenomena are modeled by the “tweaking” of the initial 
model – terms and model elements are added, parameter values adjusted, etc. – and the 
application of the family of models in question is thereby extended and perhaps 
sharpened (that is, made more accurate as models of systems to which their pre-tweaked 
cousins had been applied). If a phenomenon we might have thought to be of a piece with 
some others turns out not to be amenable to this “tweak-and-extend” treatment, it is, and 
should be, treated as a different kind of phenomenon after all; we should conclude that, 
pending further developments, there is no generic kind that subsumes all of the relevant 
cases. 
 How might the tweak-and-extend approach play out in cognitive-scientific 
practice? Consider, for example, Rumelhart, Hinton, and McClelland’s (1986) schematic 
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presentation of the idea of a connectionist model; it contains, among other things, units 
with individual levels of activation, arranged in layers, and that can pass activation 
forward to units in the adjacent layer, the activation levels of which are determined by a 
function that takes incoming activation (or inhibition) as input, and so on. The authors lay 
out these basic elements and, with respect to each of them, describe differential effects of, 
for example, different possible parameter settings or choice of activation functions. 
Different ways of filling in the schema produce different kinds of behavior in the 
resulting networks, introducing the possibility that one can construct an expanding family 
of interrelated models that accounts for a broader and broader range of forms of 
intelligent behavior (ibid., 46ff).  
 What it is to be a connectionist model, then, is to be a model that instantiates 
Rumelhart et al.’s recipe or to models that themselves bear a tweak-and-extend relation to 
instantiations of Rumelhart et al.’s schema. And our best evidence that two kinds of 
process are both instances of connectionist processing – that is, that they share the natural 
kind in question – is that our best models of the two processes are both connectionist 
models. This approach rules out certain possibilities: one cannot without excessive 
contortions begin with an ur-PDP model (a straightforward instantiation of Rumelhart et 
al.’s schema) and transform it by tweaks into a look-up table. 
 I propose the tweak-and-extend approach as a general account of evidence 
relevant to judgements about the sameness of kinds, one that makes sense of work across 
the sciences. Take, for example, being a harmonic oscillator. One begins with a simple 
equation describing the behavior of an idealized pendulum; in an attempt to model a 
wider ranges of systems, one adds a term for friction, and then a forcing function, and so 
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on. That this family of “tweaked-and-extended” models has fruitful application to a 
variety of physical systems is strong evidence that those systems instantiate a shared kind 
– harmonic oscillator.11 
 A full-dress presentation and defense of the tweak-and-extend approach would 
exceed limitations of space. Here I content myself with the discussion of one potential 
objection, to do with the boundary between models that are related by tweak-and-extend, 
on the one hand, and those that are not so related, on the other. How, one might wonder, 
does the view handle a long series of tweaks? Might it be easy enough to construct, in the 
incremental fashion of a sorites argument, a family of models interrelated by tweaks, two 
of the members of which, considered pairwise, seem quite unrelated to each other?12 
Perhaps the simplest reasonable approach to such cases would be defer to the intuitions of 
experts and practitioners, to tell us when a series of tweaks produces a result “beyond 
recognition.”13  
 Ideally, though, we should want a more substantive way to separate apparent 
similarity from similarity that genuinely indicates sameness of kind. This might involve 
identification of aspects of the data variation in which is accounted for by two models’ 
shared components (that is, whatever remains common to them after the tweaking 
required to construct one model from the other). The method might take something like 
the following form: take two candidate models; identify their shared elements or 
structure; vary systems that those models have successfully targeted in the past along the 
                                                      
11 For a further example, see Chemero’s discussion of Haken-Kelso-Bunz model and its various extensions 
and refinements (2009, 85–96). 
12 Thanks to Jackson Kernion for pushing me on this point. 
13 Although one might wonder about the extent to which such judgements will vary with the particular 
context, with, for example, the purpose the expert has in mind when asked the relevant question (cf. Block 
1997). 
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dimension that the models’ shared components were mapped onto in the cases of 
previous successful applications; see whether corresponding variations in the shared 
components of the models account for variance in other measurable quantities of the 
target systems (variance that accompanies variation in the part of the target systems that 
corresponds to the models’ shared component). The idea is to uncover evidence that what 
is shared by two candidate models plays a causal-explanatory role or whether it is, in 
some way, incidental. If it does play a causal-explanatory role, then we place the 
candidate models in the same family, even if, prima facie, the extent of the tweaking and 
extending involved renders the models distant cousins.  
 Note that even if a shared element does causal-explanatory work, the question 
remains how best to individuate the natural kind for the presence of which evidence has 
been provided. The relevant aspects of the target system (the aspects that correspond to 
the shared component in question as well as those variance in which is accounted for by 
changes in the value of the shared component) should guide our characterization of the 
kind. If, for example, we are to treat the models’ shared component as indicative of the 
presence of the generic kind cognition, then the data in question had better be relevant to 
what we take to be cognitive phenomena, not to, for instance, overall size or mass of the 
target systems. 
 The preceding is, by needs, sketchy and incomplete. Bear in mind, however, that 
my purpose is not to present a theory of what it is to be a generic kind, but to articulate a 
more structured framework within which to attempt to construct a naturalistic argument 
for realism. 
IV. What Is Cognition? 
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Whether groups have cognitive states – that is, are in states of the same natural kind as 
human cognitive states – depends partly, of course, on the empirical facts about cognition 
itself. Cognition is a scientific kind, hypothesized by the relevant sciences to explain 
(what we take to be) a particular domain of phenomena concerning, in the first instance, 
the behavior of individual humans: conversation in real time, patterns of similarity in the 
treatment of objects (reidentification), the production of works of art, the formulation and 
testing of scientific theories, the playing of chess, performance on reading comprehension 
exams, etc.14 
 What, then, is cognition? In other work (Rupert 2004, 2009, 2010), I have argued 
that virtually all successful forms of cognitive modeling – computational, brute 
biological, robotics-based, connectionist, and dynamicist – distinguish between, on the 
one hand, the relatively integrated, relatively persisting architecture, and, on the other, 
more transient causal contributors that, together with aspects of the architecture, produce 
intelligent behavior (cf. Wilson’s [2002] distinction between obligate and facultative 
systems), and, moreover, that this provides our best clue to the distinction between 
genuinely cognitive causes to the production of intelligent behavior and other 
contributing causes. Think of this as an inference to the best (available) explanation, 
twice over. First, that some distinctive and central aspect of cognitive processing is 
typically instantiated within the boundary of individual organisms explains why various 
modeling approaches that focus on the individual have been as successful as they have 
                                                      
14 This approach might seem to beg the question in the current context, but it represents standard 
methodology in the sciences. If the process of investigation works properly, then, in the normal course of 
scientific research, which of the various phenomena turn out to be of a piece – that is, which are in fact 
produced by processes of the same kind – will emerge, regardless of the initial inclinations of researchers to 
group phenomena in one way rather than in another. 
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been. Second, that the persisting architecture is the distinctively cognitive thing in 
question best explains why it runs through the various forms of successful individual-
level modeling. 
 Can we say anything more precise about the integrated nature of the system 
appearing inside the skin, anything that sheds light on its role as a cognitive system, that 
is, a system that flexibly produces a wide range of forms of intelligent behavior? In 
earlier work on the topic (Rupert 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013), I proposed that a cognitive 
system consists of a collection of mechanisms that co-contribute in overlapping subsets to 
the production of a wide range of forms of intelligent behavior as well as a mathematical 
measure meant to cash out the requirement “in overlapping subsets” (Rupert 2009, 2010). 
This mathematical measure is, in essence, a theory of integration. Though motivated by 
an attempt to characterize the internal cognitive system, the measure is location-neutral; it 
distinguishes between two kinds of causal contributor, wherever they appear, to the 
production of intelligent behavior. 
 Here, then, is what I now call the ‘conditional probability of co-contribution’ 
account of cognitive integration, or CPC, now refined so as to clarify its structure. Bear in 
mind that, although the description to follow has a procedural flavor – as if it were a 
recipe for carrying out a construction – it is meant to characterize the property of 
cognitive integration itself: 
 
1. For a subject at a time, form each non-singleton subset of the mechanisms that have 
distinctively causally contributed to the production of any form of intelligent behavior.  
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2. For each such subset, relative to each form of intelligent behavior,  there is, for each of 
its proper subsets, a probability of its being a causal contributor to the production of that 
form of behavior conditional on every member of the complement of that set’s 
contributing causally.  
 
3. Rank order all such conditional probabilities. 
 
4. Take the natural cut-off between the higher probabilities and lower ones. (If 
something’s being an integrated system is a natural kind, and the current proposal is on 
the right track, we should expect such a statistically significant gap to appear.)  
 
5. For each mechanism appearing on the list of sets with higher conditional probabilities 
(that is, the sets above the gap referred to at Step 4.), count the number of times that 
mechanism appears and rank order individual mechanisms accordingly (that is, according 
to their number of appearances above the gap on the list produced by Step 4.). 
 
6. A statistically significant gap separates those mechanisms that appear frequently on 
this second list from those that do not. 
 
7. The integrated cognitive system comprises all and only those mechanisms appearing 
above that gap on the second list. 
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Presented in this formal way, CPC’s implications may remain obscure. Consider an 
example, then. The typical subject is quite good at avoiding obstacles as she moves 
about, and an visual edge-detection mechanism has almost certainly causally contributed 
to such behavior. A mechanism that computes distance from retinal disparity will 
likewise have contributed to obstacle avoidance in the typical subject, as will have a 
mechanism that calculates shape from detected shading (Marr 1982). With regard to the 
avoidance of obstacles, many further mechanisms have contributed, for instance, various 
motor control mechanisms. To keep matters relatively simple, let us add only one such 
motor-control mechanism to the mixture of mechanisms under consideration. The 
resulting set of four mechanisms allows the possibility of six two-membered sets, four 
three-membered sets, and one four-membered set. For each two-membered set, two 
conditional probabilities are relevant: the first-mechanism’s contributing conditional on 
the second’s, and vice versa; this yields a total of twelve entries on the rank-ordered list 
constructed at CPC’s Step 3. For each of the four three-membered sets, there are six 
relevant conditional probabilities: each single mechanism’s contributing conditional on 
the other two’s, and each combination of two’s contributing conditional on the third’s; 
this yields a total of twenty-four additional entries on the rank-ordered list constructed at 
CPC’s Step 3. For the four-membered set, there are fourteen relevant conditional 
probabilities (which thus represent fourteen further entries to the rank-ordered list in 
question). For any one of the four, we must include the probability of its contributing 
conditional on the contribution of the remaining three, and vice versa, which yields eight 
entries. The remaining proper subsets of the four-membered set are pairs, as are the 
complements in all such cases. For any such pair, and there is a conditional probability of 
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its contributing given that its complement is contributing. That yields six entries, which 
together with the eight from our lopsided divisions of the four-membered set, equals a 
total of fourteen entries contributed by the four-membered set. Relative to only this one 
kind of behavior and only these four elements, we already have fifty entries on the rank-
ordered list associated with CPC’s Step 3. Now go through this procedure – in principle! 
– for every grouping of all causally contributing mechanisms relative to each form of 
intelligent behavior that has been exhibited by the subject in question (so long as the 
subject has exhibited a reasonably wide range of forms of intelligent behavior – if not, all 
bets are off, for this richness of repertoire is one of the central features of the explananda 
of cognitive science).  
 With regard to the example at hand, each of the four mechanisms will presumably 
appear in many subsets with high conditional probabilities (in the sense that the 
probability of a proper subset of a set’s contributing will be high given that the 
complement of the set is contributing). This is a feature of the mechanisms and the form 
of behavior chosen. For instance, one might reasonably think that the probability of the 
edge-detection mechanism’s contributing given that the shape-from-shading mechanism 
is contributing is close to one; it would seem that every time the shape-from-shading 
mechanism contributes to the avoidance of obstacles, the edge-detection mechanism also 
contributes, at least for the typical subject, partly because, as we might say informally, 
they are both fundamental mechanisms of visual processing. Similarly for P(edge 
detection|shape-from-shading & distance from retinal disparity) and for P(distance from 
retinal disparity & edge detection|shape-from-shading). Notice, however, that sets 
including only the three visual mechanisms may well deliver higher conditional 
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probabilities than sets that mix the motor-control mechanism with the visual mechanisms, 
particularly where the motor-control mechanism is being conditioned upon. It seems 
highly probable that if the visual mechanisms are guiding obstacle avoidance, then the 
motor-control mechanism is. But, perhaps the motor control mechanism also contributes 
to obstacle avoidance in cases in which, for example, one successfully navigates a 
familiar room in the dark, with little visual guidance. Thus, P(shape-from-shading|motor 
control) may be significantly lower than the conditional probabilities just considered. 
This will likely not be the case when the motor-control mechanism is being conditioned 
upon alongside a visual mechanism. For example, P(shape-from-shading|motor control & 
edge detection) is not likely to be any lower than conditional probabilities involving only 
our three visual mechanisms; for, if the motor-control mechanism in question is 
contributing along with the edge detection mechanism to obstacle avoidance, then we’re 
almost certainly talking about visually guided obstacle avoidance, in which case shape-
from-shading is almost certain to be contributing as well. As a result, consideration of our 
four mechanisms in connection with obstacle avoidance would presumably yield many 
subsets with high conditional probabilities (those that appear above the cut-off point at 
CPC’s Step 4), even if the motor-control mechanism shows up in fewer than do the other 
three.  
 CPC was initially formulated in an attempt to adjudicate claims about extended 
cognition, in particular, the claim that contemporary cognitive science has revealed 
human cognition to be extended in a deep and theoretically important way (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998). If cognition must occur within the cognitive system, as delineated by 
CPC, then it would seem that for most individual human subjects at most times, cognitive 
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processing occurs within the boundaries of the subject’s body; for, generally speaking, 
the preceding characterization of the cognitive system cuts against the inclusion of 
special-purpose tools and one-offs, which tends to be the status of causal contributors 
beyond the boundary of the body. (A special purpose tool will likely appear in many sets 
with high conditional probabilities relative to a single form of intelligent behavior, but 
will not appear in such sets relative to other forms of intelligent behavior, putting that 
special-purpose mechanism at a significant disadvantage at Step 5 relative to mechanisms 
that contribute to a variety of forms of intelligent behavior.) The location of individual 
human cognition is largely an empirical matter, though. The systems-based proposal CPC 
leaves open the possibility that a tool – perhaps an iPhone (Chalmers 2008) – that 
consistently contributes to the production of a variety of forms of intelligent behavior 
across a variety of contexts, alongside a shifting set of co-collaborators that themselves 
have similar standing, is part of a human’s cognitive system. 
 But why think CPC is correct? Flexibility is the heart of cognition and 
intelligence – flexibility in learning, in the acquisition of concepts and skills, in problem-
solving, and in the deployment of a variety of resources in the pursuit of and revision of 
goals in an oft-changing environment. It is this flexibility that attracts attention to certain 
forms human behavior and performance, and motivates the development of a distinctive 
science (cognitive science) to study them, in contrast to tropes and other stereotyped 
forms of behavior. It is the lack of such flexibility that drives continuing complaints 
about extant forms of artificial intelligence. “It’s not intelligence at all,” one is tempted to 
say about such systems, “It wouldn’t have any idea what to do if an unexpected situation 
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were to arise! It does only that one thing!” – whether that one thing is playing chess, 
answering quiz-show questions, or controlling an automobile. 
 CPC is grounded in the idea that flexibility is achieved in humans only by the 
presence of many units poised to work together in various combinations. There’s 
plentiful evidence that this sort of thing happens in the human brain (Anderson 2010, 
2014; Cole et al. 2013; Botvinick and Cohen 2014). On some accounts of this sort of 
process, subnetworks with overlapping members wrest control from each other via 
competitive processing. When two functional subnetworks have overlapping members, it 
may take only a bit of differential stimulus to shift the agent’s activity from the 
performance of one task to the performance of a different one. On this approach, a shift in 
task doesn’t require an entirely new network to take control from a previously dominant 
one; more subtle shifts in the co-activation of elements, some of which are already active, 
can more smoothly effect such a transition. The systems-based view CPC emphasizes 
what seems likely to be a central trait of such a system – that any given mechanism is 
capable of cooperating with various other subsets of mechanisms to complete a variety of 
tasks. 
V. Group Cognitive States? 
We have in hand, then, an abstract characterization of the cognitive system that delivers a 
minimal subject of cognitive states. Given the thin-ness of that subject, proponents of 
group cognition might take heart. It appears that the individual human’s cognitive system 
– regardless of whether it is wholly internal – is little more than a jointly packaged 
collection of “demons,” all doing their individual bits to produce flexible behavior, absent 
a Cartesian theatre and with little in the way of a central controller (Dennett 1991). 
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Surely, in many extant groups, we find something like this, perhaps even a relatively 
persisting collection of mechanisms that contribute in overlapping subsets to the 
production of a wide variety of forms of behavior! Thus, some, perhaps many, groups 
would appear to meet the systems-based necessary condition for the possession of 
cognitive states. 
 Given the extensive differences in detail across the group and individual case, 
however, we should want to know what exactly to look for, if we are to find cognition at 
the group level. The material from Sections III and IV suggests the following picture. 
Imagine that social scientists have completed careful studies of organizational structure, 
group dynamics, etc. In fact, sufficient resources have been devoted to such study as to 
provide for experimental interventions. And, imagine that our best models of the data 
collected draw a consistent distinction, at the level of the group architecture or 
organization, between relatively persisting resources and the passing parade of other 
resources that causally contribute to the production of the phenomena of interest. But, 
imagine that when one models the co-contribution relations between the components of 
the persisting package, the relation that emerges is not best captured by conditional 
probabilities of co-contributions in the manner of the construction of Section IV. The 
probabilistic measure the fitting of which best captures the relations between what would 
appear to be the obligate parts of the group system is instead grounded in the relation 
changing the likelihood of co-contribution of two others (cf. Klein 2010): take any three 
causally contributing mechanisms and ask to what extent the contribution of any one of 
the three alters the probability of the contribution of the other two; then cluster the 
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resulting values in a fashion analogous to the manner in which conditional probabilities 
of co-contribution are clustered above. 
 Such a model would bear a tweak-and-extend relation to Section IV’s model of a 
cognitive system. For example, “1. For a subject at a time, form each non-singleton 
subset of the mechanisms that have distinctively causally contributed to the production of 
any form of intelligent behavior...” becomes “1. For a subject at a time, form each triplet 
of the mechanisms that have distinctively causally contributed to the production of any 
form of intelligent behavior...”, which clearly constitutes a tweak. Common to the models 
is some probabilistic relation of co-contribution that binds some of the causally 
contributing mechanisms together, into a single system, in contrast to the status of other 
contributing mechanisms. This provides a concrete sense of what it would be for a group 
to engage in a different kind of cognition from an individual human, but cognition 
nevertheless. 
VI. Complications 
Some readers may wonder whether I have made matters too easy for the proponent of 
group cognition. In virtually any case in which a persisting system contributes to the 
production of some phenomenon of interest (alongside various other causal contributors), 
it’s almost certain that some probabilistic measure or other partitions the causes into two 
groups, where the members of one group are components of the persisting system in 
question and the members of other group are the remaining causes. And, it would seem 
that an expression of just about any such probabilistic measure could be constructed by 
tweaking CPC. But, what makes a model substantive and interesting, one might think, are 
the interrelations between elements specified by the model, not merely by such a thin fact 
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as that the causally contributing elements of the model resolve into two groups.15 A 
connectionist model must include processing units that have activation values and that 
can pass activation to other units to which they are directly connected. This places a 
significant constraint on the “same-generic-kind-as” relation in the case of being a 
connectionist network. But, a model that merely applies probabilistic measures to cluster 
certain of the contributing causes together makes very few demands on a system – too 
few, one might think to be taken seriously as an account of cognition, as a causal-
explanatory kind.16 The remainder of this section explores this potential problem and two 
others, concluding with a pessimistic evaluation of the prospects for a realism about 
group cognitive states. 
 
1. The problem of missing conditions. Something is clearly missing from section IV’s 
characterization of the cognitive system, at least if it is intended to capture the kind being 
cognitive. Think of the problem in this way: my characterization requires, of the 
mechanisms in question, that they causally contribute to the production of intelligent 
behavior; nevertheless, the systemic integrity in question seems to have nothing 
                                                      
15 Compare the search for a generic conception of cognition to the search for a generic grounding relation. 
In particular, consider Jonathan Schaffer’s response to Jessica Wilson’s criticisms of the claim that there is 
an interesting generic conception of grounding (Wilson 2016). Schaffer contends that what is common to 
various specific dependence relations (which, on Wilson’s view, are the objects of genuine interest) is that 
they can all be represented using structural equation models (Schaffer 2016), and that this yields a useful 
general understanding of the grounding relation. One might reasonably wonder, though, whether the thin 
property subject to being represented by a structural equation model does significant explanatory work, 
absent the filling in of the dynamics relative to a particular relation, domain, or class of systems. It is 
unclear, for instance, what interesting range of counterfactual inferences is licensed just by a relation’s 
instantiating the property subject to being represented by a structural equation model. 
16 Consider a corresponding point about Ramsey sentences: one might worry that a Ramsey sentence can be 
used to represent a theory of any domain that contains interrelated properties, without doing violence to the 
theory. It would thus be ill-advised for a functionalist in philosophy of mind to assert that any system that 
can be modeled using a Ramsey sentence has a mind! (And the flexibility of the Ramsey-sentence 
formalism should come as no surprise. Consider Lewis’s use of it as a general tool for characterizing 
theoretical terms – Lewis 1970.) 
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specifically to do with cognition. The measure of probabilistic clustering of contributing 
mechanisms could be used to capture, for example, biological or chemical systems. It is 
partly on account of this worry that I’m inclined to treat CPC as an articulation of only a 
necessary condition for a state’s being cognitive.17 
 What must be added? One obvious suggestion is that the system trade in 
representations (Rupert 2005), perhaps representations that are governed by a specific 
kind of algorithm or process (Rupert 2018b). Or, one might plausibly require that for 
something to be a cognitive system, it must have cognitive states of specific types – that it 
must, for example, have some genuine memories, beliefs, or perceptual states. But, 
whatever else is demanded of a family of models that captures cognition, we should 
worry that the inclusion of such further conditions raises the bar to a height that typical 
groups do not meet. 
 Here’s another way to come at this concern. To a great extent, an ecumenical 
attitude toward the variety of forms of successful cognitive-scientific modeling motivated 
the formulation of Section IV’s systems-based criterion. Part of the idea was to show, 
without begging the question against, say, anti-representationalists, that a plausible 
necessary condition on cognition – one that everyone should agree to – cuts ice in the 
debate over extended cognition. At other times the motive was pluralist: perhaps all of 
the even moderately successful forms of modeling in cognitive science have got hold of 
something important, and thus what is common to the programs illuminates the nature of 
                                                      
17 Note that treatment of it as a necessary condition serves certain dialectical purposes sufficiently well. If, 
for example, (a) anywhere mental states appear, there must also be cognition, (b) a state’s obtaining within 
a cognitive system of the sort characterized in Section IV is a necessary condition on a state’s being 
cognitive, and (c) extant groups do not have cognitive systems, an interesting conclusion follows: extant 
groups do not have mental states. 
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cognition. The value of such open-minded-ness duly acknowledged, it is entirely possible 
that a certain family of models of human cognition will, as cognitive science matures, 
win out decisively; in which case, ecumenical and pluralistic motives will appear 
excessively circumspect. Instead, cognitive science will have identified cognition, in the 
human case, with some fairly specific kind of architecture and processes, leaving little 
reason to think the study of our paradigmatic cases of cognition will yield a thin, 
overarching property being a cognitive system that groups might instantiate – as opposed 
to their being merely persisting systems, which many groups clearly are.  
 
2. The problem of flexible, intelligent behavior. Many groups simply do not produce a 
wide range of forms of intelligent behavior. Those that make frequent appearances in the 
literature on group cognition exhibit a high-degree of task specificity: the U.S. Supreme 
Court produces decisions, the stock market predicts companies’ future performance, a 
basketball team plays basketball, a group of sailors pilot, but in each case, the group does 
not do a whole lot else, as a coherent group. 
 In contrast, properly cognitive systems produce a wide range of forms of 
intelligent behavior; the characterization of any one form of a subject’s behavior as 
intelligent depends on the subject’s producing a wide range of other forms of intelligent 
behavior. The single subject’s ability to produce a wide range of forms of behavior in a 
flexible manner constitutes one of cognitive science’s central explananda. As noted 
above, a longstanding complaint about artificial intelligence turns on just this point: the 
achievements of Deep Blue, MYCIN, self-driving cars, Alpha Go, and many other 
specialized and expert systems are too narrowly targeted to manifest genuine intelligence. 
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Intelligence requires the ability to solve all sorts of problems flexibly – to prioritize tasks, 
to switch between tasks in appropriate ways at appropriate times, to switch between 
strategies for the accomplishing a given task as the situation demands, and so on (to tell a 
joke or sing a song when it’s called for, to study for the Medical College Admission Test, 
when that’s called for, etc.).  
 Typical groups do not seem to have the right structure to exhibit a wide range of 
forms of intelligent behavior. And, to the extent that groups exhibit some flexibility, a 
certain asymmetry in the production of such behavior seems telling. It is virtually always 
the case that where a group exhibits flexibility of degree y, each contributing individual 
in the group who helps to bring about the behavior in question is capable of cognitive 
flexibility of degree x, where x is significantly greater than y. This would seem to be the 
opposite of the situation in the individual human’s case. Individual humans may well 
have specialized subsystems responsible for performing much of the work in their 
purview. Nevertheless, the individual subject as a whole has a much more flexible 
capacity than any individual module or specialized subsystem. In contrast, group actions 
are virtually always carried out, or enacted, by individual members (or representatives) of 
the group, which members are individually significantly more flexible than the group. 
Perhaps this fact alone does not speak against realism about group states. But, this 
asymmetry – the fact that the individuals are more flexible than the group – should give 
us pause; in such a case, it would appear that genuinely intelligent beings are cooperating 
to organize a group that is, as in the case of A.I, only a relatively inflexible replica of a 
specialized skill.18  
                                                      
18 Thanks to Gabriel Rabin for pushing me to clarify my view about these matters. 
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3. The problem of constraints on model-selection. We derive substantive conclusions 
from tweak-and-extend relations only when the models in question are our best models of 
the relevant phenomena. Thus, canons of model-selection – and methodological 
considerations, more generally speaking – bear on the debate about group cognition. 
These include such methodological desiderata as simplicity, conservatism, and unity of 
science, as well as the guiding principles of statistical modeling. 
 The contribution of methodological principles threatens to cause problems for 
realists. If, for example, a constraint on a state’s being cognitive is that it be 
representational, then concerns about, for example, quantitative parsimony (Nolan 1997) 
rear their head. Consider a case in which all of the members of an appellate court vote to 
uphold a criminal conviction, although not one of them believes the party in question is 
guilty. Does that show that the court is in a representational state – perhaps a belief that 
the accused is guilty – that differs from, and exists in addition to, the cognitive states of 
the individual court members? Considerations of quantitative parsimony suggest not. 
Positing an additional representational state – the court’s cognitive state – is gratuitous 
and thus would not find its way into the model of the phenomenon in question (that is, the 
court’s issuing of a decision). For, presumably, each individual member of the court has 
his or her reasons for voting to uphold the conviction even though she or he does not 
believe the accused is guilty. Such reasons might range from an individual justice’s 
principled commitment to precedent to a belief that there will be a riot if the accused is 
set free to a belief in a premise-based approach to judicial decisions. Once, however, such 
reasons have been included in one’s model of the court’s issuing of the decision, all of 
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the representational resources needed to explain the event are at hand (Rupert 2005, 
2011, 2014; Wilson 2004). Adding more of the same, that is, more representational 
resources, is gratuitous. Ceteris paribus, then, canons of model selection dictate the 
choice of a model in which representational states do not appear as states of the group as 
a whole. Therefore, our best overall model of group-involving processes that produce 
intelligent behavior (if such behavior exists) will not attribute representational states to 
groups, contra List’s Premise 1. 
 This moral might be expressed not so much in terms of parsimony but as a point 
about reduction and the unity of science. It is a canon of model selection that, other things 
being equal, we should prefer models of phenomena that dovetail with successful models 
in adjacent domains. Or, to water this down a bit, it is a canon of model selection that 
ceteris paribus, when attempting to draw ontological conclusions from successful 
modeling, favor collections of models that present a unified picture of nature over those 
that do not. Consider, on the one hand, a model according to which social and political 
institutions have cognitive states, because they exhibit rationality over time, and, on the 
other hand, a model according to which only individual human cognitive processes 
explain measurable phenomena related to social and political institutions (ignoring all of 
the other components of both kinds of model, such as sheets of paper, gasoline pumps, 
etc.). The latter view is more consistent with an emphasis on the unity of science. Or, one 
might combine these two concerns in the form of a dilemma: either the proponent of 
group cognitive states opts for freestanding and mysterious group processes, in which 
case she offends against the unity of science, or she makes a genuine effort to integrate 
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models in a single package and thereby offends against quantitative parsimony, if she 
insists that groups have cognitive states of their own.19 
 One should be careful not to be misled by talk of reduction, however. Return to 
List’s realist argument presented in Section II, which vaguely suggests an anti-
reductionist line of thought – the idea being that if the social sciences make productive 
use of attributions of group beliefs and desires, a card-carrying naturalist should not resist 
(unless the states in question can be reduced). This vague impression is reinforced by 
various remarks in List and Pettit (2011) about, for example, interlevel relations (ibid., 4), 
multi-level causal competition (ibid., 161), the realization of group attitudes by individual 
attitudes (ibid., 77), supervenience (as a relation between levels – ibid., 65), and the 
difficulties of reducing group attitudes to individual attitudes (ibid., 76–77, 194). But, this 
framing of the issue strikes me as confused or at least misleading. Generally speaking, the 
question of reduction is an interlevel question (as are questions about supervenience and 
realization), arising in the case of different scientific domains with different sets of 
properties, and this is often put in terms of relations between different levels. Yet, that is 
decidedly not the sort of case at hand. The group and individual cognitive states are 
supposed to be of the same kind, parts of the same domain: the mental, psychological, or 
cognitive. This is what’s supposed to be striking about the realism in question. After all, 
it would be no surprise to find out merely that some states or other at the group level play 
                                                      
19 It might be objected that the invoking of canons of theory selection is heavy handed, for the status of 
such canons is contested, and their historical contribution to scientific reasoning complex and opaque. 
Rather, it might be thought, the discussion is best limited to consideration of first-order reasons for or 
against proffered explanations of specific phenomena, data, or effects. Point taken. But, so far as I can tell, 
the concerns expressed here can be translated into first-order arguments on a case-by-case basis: we know 
why the justices voted the way they did, and thus we know why the decision is what it is, without any 
reference to a group cognitive state. And this way of viewing the matter dispenses with any need to appeal 
to an overarching methodological principle. Thanks to Peter Achinstein for pressing me on this point. 
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a causal-explanatory role (cf. “the weight of the group caused the terrace to collapse”). 
List and Pettit seem to lose sight of this when making what they take to be a realism-
vindicating comparison between (a) the relation between group cognitive states and 
individual cognitive states and (b) the relation between individual cognitive states and 
“the configuration and functioning of biological subsystems” (ibid., 7); they argue that, if 
it is legitimate to resist reduction in case (b), then case (a) should be treated likewise 
(ibid., 78; cf. Goldstone and Gureckis 2009, Huebner 2008). This argument by analogy 
fails, however. Case (b) concerns two genuinely different sets of properties (cognitive 
properties, on the one hand, and biological properties, on the other), aptly raising 
questions of reduction and anti-reduction. But, case (a) concerns the very same kinds of 
properties and states, on both sides of its comparison, not one set of properties or states of 
one kind realizing or supervening on properties or states of another.20 Thus, one cannot 
simply take on board anti-reductionist resources used in case (b) to defuse parsimony-
based arguments aimed at case (a).21 
 Here’s another way to see this: in case (b), reduction, in the intertheoretic sense, is 
blocked by anti-reductionist arguments (Fodor 1974, for instance), and we thereby 
ontologically certify a domain of properties – psychological, mental, or cognitive ones. 
                                                      
20 List and Pettit sometimes seem to acknowledge this fact (2011, 1, 78) but do not seem to appreciate the 
extent to which it undermines their defense of group agents.  
21 In response, one might advert to the widespread acceptance of both personal and sub-personal levels 
(rather than the relation between the psychological and the neural levels) in cognitive theorizing (Huebner 
2008). If, disregarding the pull of parsimony, we refuse to eliminate the personal level in favor of the 
subpersonal one, we should not allow the individual level to crowd out the group level, the thinking goes. 
To my mind, however, the personal-subpersonal distinction has no substantive role to play in cognitive 
science (see Rupert 2018a for arguments to this effect); in which case, the realist can take no consolation 
here. Moreover, most philosophers who accept the existence of a personal level take the states appearing 
there to be of a different kind from those that appear at the subpersonal level. Thus, the supposed 
distinction between the personal and subpersonal levels does not provide an example of a case in which the 
same psychological, mental, or cognitive properties appear at different levels. 
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Case (a), however, involves the situation in which we have already let cognitive or 
mental kind into our ontology, and the only question is how far to spread them around. 
Case (b) is an interlevel matter; case (a) an intralevel matter. That is why List and Pettit’s 
argument by analogy is inapt, and in case (a), the case at hand, we should focus on 
quantitative parsimony (Nolan 1997), the question of how many instances of a given, 
already countenanced kind of state or property we should include in our scientific 
models.22 
 Consider a final response to concerns about parsimony and reduction. List and 
Pettit claim, “The agency of the group relates in such a complex way to the agency of 
individuals that we have little chance of tracking the dispositions of the group agent and 
of interacting with it as an agent to contest or interrogate, persuade or coerce, if we 
conceptualize its doings at the individual level” (2011, 76). I find this remark puzzling. 
Throughout their book, List in Pettit develop precise analyses of how best to construct 
groups so that the groups will exhibit rationality (as best as can be done given various 
impossibility results). Moreover, these recipes tell us exactly who to talk to in an 
organization, because they tell us, relatively transparently, who will be voting on (or 
otherwise having a determinative say about) what. For example, List and Pettit 
                                                      
22 In a discussion of some of my previous work on group cognition (Rupert 2014), Himmelreich (2015) 
complains that in making a quantitative-parsimony-based argument against realism, I do not avail myself of 
various conceptual tools emerging from debates about causal exclusion. But, given comments in the main 
text, it might seem clear why the proposed path is less promising than Himmelreich takes it to be. The 
conceptual tools developed in debates about causal exclusion are generally aimed at interlevel relations; in 
Kim’s standard diagram (e.g., in Kim 1998), the vertical relations at issue are supervenience relations, 
which are normally taken to hold between distinct families of properties. But, the relation between group 
states and individual states are not meant by realists to concern relations between distinct sets of properties. 
After all, if the sets of properties are distinct, why do realists use the same terms – e.g., ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ 
– to talk about group states as are used to talk about individual states? Note, too, that when List and Pettit 
pursue the tack proposed by Himmelreich, they approach the problem specifically as a problem about 
multi-level causation (2011, 161), which doesn’t suit the case of cognitive states competing with cognitive 
states; that wouldn’t be a matter of multi-level causation, for the reasons given above. 
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demonstrate formally that, under certain conditions, an effective procedure for 
maintaining group rationality is to divide logically interrelated questions on an agenda in 
the following way: identify premises, assign a subgroup of members with relevant 
specialized knowledge to each of the premises, take a majority-rules vote among each of 
the subgroups on that group’s assigned premise, and then reach a conclusion based only 
on the outcomes of those votes (that is, follow a premise-based procedure) (List and Pettit 
2011, 95). In that case, it seems apparent to whom one should speak if one would like to 
persuade the group to reach one’s favored conclusion or to coerce a certain outcome: the 
members of the specialized subgroup that one thinks one has the best chance of winning 
over. (There exists an entire industry in the United States – the lobbying industry – built 
on this kind of observation.) What List and Pettit take to be group attitudes supervene on 
individual attitudes and, as they emphasize, sometimes in a not entirely straightforward 
way. Fair enough. But, the lion’s share of their book demonstrates exactly why and for 
what principled reasons the pattern of supervenience should be less-than-entirely-
straightforward. And, by explaining the less-than-entirely-straightforward relations to 
individual decisions that fix supervening facts about the group, List and Pettit themselves 
demonstrate that a less-than-entirely-straightforward supervenience relation does not 
entail the sort of opacity that might motivate the positing of autonomous group states. 
They provide recipes for the construction of group states by individuals and thereby 
provide the guidebook for conceptualizing those states as amalgamations of individual 
decisions (cf. Rupert 2005, 179; Roth 2014)23 – not as genuine group states – which tells 
                                                      
23 Rupert (2005) and Roth (2014) emphasize the role of higher-order individual states in reduction- or 
otherwise parsimony-based criticisms of realism, such higher-order states as an individual’s endorsing a 
rule of aggregation or supporting a canonical procedure for constructing a group’s officially stated 
conclusion. An example of such a canonical procedure would be the following of precedent in the legal 
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us which individuals should be influenced on which questions at what stage in a given 
process in order to bring about the results we would like. 
 
Conclusion. In Sections II-V, I motivated an interest in the theory of natural kinds as a 
tool for evaluating realism about group cognition; offered a theory of the sort of evidence 
germane to the determination of sameness of natural kind; and applied the theory to the 
case of the overarching kind cognition, in the hope of offering the realist a way forward. 
In the final section, prohibitive difficulties mounted. I conclude, then, that the prospects 
for the discovery of genuinely cognitive states in groups appear dim, though much 
depends on empirical work yet to be done.  
 In particular, although this closing section has been generally pessimistic in its 
evaluation of the prospects for realism, it is worth mentioning an empirical avenue worth 
pursuing. It might be that, although CPC does not seem to capture a robust or interesting 
property – beyond something’s being a coherent system – the kind of structure 
characterized is, in fact, just the kind of structure needed to support flexible behavior 
(timely switching between tasks, etc.). Perhaps, nomologically speaking, there is no other 
way to construct a system that exhibits flexibility of the right sort except to endow it with 
a broad collection of mechanisms that contribute in overlapping subsets to the production 
of a wide range of forms of behavior; perhaps it is this structure in particular that 
facilitates flexibility. In which case, such structure would have more to do with the nature 
                                                      
arena. It’s one thing to believe that the legally correct decision, based only on law as it’s written, is P. It’s 
another thing to believe that the correct judgement, based only on law as it’s written, is not-P, but that the 
best thing for the court to do on balance, given P-related precedents, is to decide that P. A justice with a 
higher-order commitment to the role of precedent may well find herself in the latter situation. In defending 
realism against reductive or otherwise parsimony-based criticisms, List and Pettit, as well as Gilbert, argue 
as if the critic has only first-order states of the individual (such as the belief that the defendant is guilty) to 
work with. That, however, is to argue against a straw individualism. 
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of cognition than sometimes suggested above and the search for such structure in groups 
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